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THE HALL OF MIRRORS: WIFE ABUSE AND 
THE LAW IN AN ERA OF SOCIAL CHANGE 
The feminist reform movement has focused public attention on 
the great number of women who are beaten by their husbands and 
the unresponsiveness of the legal system to this critical situation. 1 
For all concerned with the dignity of women, eradication of wife 
abuse2 is an essential goal. 3 
Many present and proposed solutions concentrate either on 
erasing the sexist attitudes which breed and condone wife abuse,4 
or on helping the beaten wife to become the kind of person un­
likely to be victimized. 5 These approaches are inadequate solutions 
1. See Gingold, One of These Days-Pow-Right in the Kisser: The Truth 
About Battered Wives, Ms., August 1976, at 51; Newman, The Wife Beaters, PARADE 
MAGAZINE, June 1975, at 37; Segal, Violent Men ... Embattled Women, C9.s­
MOPOLITAN, May 1976, at 238; Stuart & McEvoy, Middle Class Violence, PSYCH. 
TODAY, November 1970, at 52; Battered Wives: Cheswick Woman Paid, NEWSWEEK, 
July 9, 1973, at 37; The Wife Beaters, MCCALLS MAGAZINE, June 1975, at 110; 
The Wife Beaters, WOMAN'S DAY, March 1976, at 61. 
2. The term wife abuse, rather than wife battering or wife assault, is used 
throughout the article to avoid confusion with legal definitions of assault and battery. 
See Note, The Case for Legal Remedies for Abused Women, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 135, 135 n.l (1977). 
3. See, e.g., [1976-1977] 3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2527 (report on International 
Law Conference on Violence in the Family). 
4. Because wife abuse has only recently become a public issue, research into 
its causes has just begun. Of the theories so far advanced, those which concentrate 
on various manifestations of sexism and sex role stereotyping seem to offer the most 
reasonable explanations. The frustrations which a man experiences in trying to be 
powerful and "manly" in a social and economic environment wherein most people 
have little power or satisfaction can be vented on the one person over whom he has 
complete power. D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 61-64 (1976). In addition, many 
people are socialized in a violent family environment. The sons of abusive husbands 
often grow up to abuse their wives. Similarly, many abused wives are the daughters 
of abused women. Id. at 22-24. Social pressures on a woman to maintain a happy 
home can produce the shame and guilt which lead many abused wives to endure the 
abuse rather than leave the home or seek help. Id. at 79-83. Finally, the sexist at­
titudes pervading the legal system exacerbate the problem and delay its solution. R. 
LANGLEY & R. LEVY, WIFE BEATING: THE SILENT CRISIS 172-73 (1977). 
5. One typical solution is expressed as follows: 

A woman must establish that she will not tolerate being beaten. She must 

issue an ultimatum and be prepared to back up her statements with action. 

Only after a husband is convinced that his wife will not put up with his 

abusive actions can any real progress be made toward changing his violent 

behavior. ' 

R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 203. 
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for the problem of wife abuse. Attitudes change slowly. Although 
sexism must be constantly challenged and combatted, the abused 
wife needs immediate and effective protection. In addition, al­
though for an individual wife, self-help or self-reform is perhaps 
the only viable short term solution, we contend that it is irrespon­
sible, immoral, and ultimately ineffective for the law to demand of 
the victim that she not allow herself to be victimized. The legal 
justice system must do more; it must act quickly and forcefully to 
protect a victim who, without such protection, will be forced to 
continue living with her assailant, subject to further attacks of in­
creasing severity.6 To adequately protect abused wives, the law, 
not the victim, must change. 
An analysis of the nature of social change or revolution ex­
plains the dynamics of the social and legal structure which must be 
changed to effectively cope with the problem of wife abuse. 
Theorists of ideological revolution posit7 that when a paradigmS in ' 
a particular region of human endeavor is challenged successfully it 
loses its universal influence. This brings on a period of crisis, 
characterized by conflict, contradiction, and controversy over com­
peting perspectives9 which continues until a new perspective gains 
universal acceptance and becomes the paradigm for that activity. 10 
At one time the universal view held that the relative positions 
of men and women were divinely ordained, naturally logical, and 
unalterable. 11 As a result of reformist activism that paradigm has 
6. See generally Gingold, supra note 1. 
7. In this discussion, the term "ideological revolution" includes both social and 
scientific ideology. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
(1970) (scientific ideology); Woodard, Reality and Social Reform: The Transition 
from Laissez-Faire to the Welfare State, 72 YALE L.J- 286-87 (1962) (social ideology). 
8. A paradigm is an accepted theory, view, or standard which supports an entire 
body of scientific or sociological activity. T. KUHN, supra note 7, at 10. 
9. T. KUHN, supra note 7, at 93. 
10. Woodard, supra note 7, at 287. 
History can . , , be viewed as the chronicle of the rise and fall of various 
standards. And the most cataclysmic phases in the saga of any society, the 
so-called "watershed" periods, are those in which fundamental standards are 
supplanted by new ones; standards which, by condemning conduct and con­
ditions theretofore condoned, or vice versa, generate a new type of pressure 
either to reform the existing, or to devise new, social institutions. 
ld. 
11. "The biologists of the ancient world-of whom the foremost was Aristotle 
-had affirmed that, saving unusual circumstances, males of all species live longer 
than females.... Males represented the perfection of the human species; females 
were an imperfection of nature...." Herlihy, The Natural History of Medieval Wo­
men, NATURAL HISTORY, March 1978, at 56. "Men live longer than women naturali­
ter, 'according to the natural order.' " ld. at 56, 59. 
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lost its universality.12 Social and legal attitudes toward the status of 
women are clearly in a crisis stage,13 and both civil and criminal 
law reflect uncertainty, ambivalence, and the presence of unsettled 
and opposing views. 14 Newly emerging standards, by condemning 
behavior which had previously been condoned, are generating 
pressure to reform the legal system's response to women who are 
abused by men. IS In order to achieve justice, the legal system 
must apply to abusive husbands those sanctions used against per~ 
sons who cause physical harm or death to others. 
I. SOCIAL IDEOLOGY AND THE LAW 
Efforts directed at changing the orientation of the legal justice 
system toward abused women and abusive husbands must incor~ 
porate an understanding of both the relationship between social 
values and the law, and the intrinsic characteristics of ideological 
revolution. 16 Past reformations of social and legal attitudes toward 
economic class structure and racial superiority suggest the manner 
12. "Whatever might have been the common law view of the right of a husband 
to chastise his wife, the modem view is clearly to the contrary and inhibits the use of 
physical force or violence upon the person of the wife." Berberian v. Berberian, 109 
R.1. 	273, 277, 284 A.2d 72, 74 (1971). 
For this Court now to act on Hawkins' fonnulation of the medieval view that 
husband and wife are "esteemed but as one Person in Law, and are pre­
sumed to have but one Will" would indeed be "blind imitation of the past." 
It would require us to disregard the vast changes in the status of woman­
the extention of her rights and correlative duties-whereby a wife's legal 
submission to her husband has been wholly wiped out, not only in the En­
glish speaking world generally but emphatically so in this country. 
United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 54, rehearing denied, 364 U.S. 854 (1960). 
13. 	 See note 16 infra and text accompanying note 29 infra. 
14. See, for example, the discussion of interspousal tort immunity at text ac­
companying notes 117-48 infra. 
15. For illustrations of changing standards and judicial attitudes in the criminal 
law, see note 49 infra. 
16. T. KUHN, supra note 7. "Revolutions" of political and social ideology paral­
lel those of scientific thought. ld. at 92. Scientific revolutions, Kuhn says, "necessi­
tate the community's rejection of one time-honored ... theory in favor of another 
incompatible with it." ld. at 6. They are always accompanied by controversy. "[Elach 
transfonn[s] ... the world within which scientific work [is] done." ld. Once the 
previous institution or belief has been challenged, a crisis occurs in which a choice 
must be made between competing paradigms. ld. at 93-94. Thus, once the concept of 
women as naturally inferior beings no longer held sway, the legal and social at­
titudes toward women were in crisis. The crisis exists today, resulting in contra­
dictory societal responses, with controversy accompanying each change. Laws not 
enforced by police, prosecutors, or judges, and inconsistent police response to 
"domestic disturbances" furnish quick manifestations of the tunnoil that inheres in 
the crisis stage. See text accompanying notes 49-115 infra. 
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in which statutory and case law develop to reflect social values. A 
brief digression to examine the effect of Social Darwinism and the 
industrial revolution on the status of the poor, and the social con­
text of the rise and fall of the "separate but equal" doctrine will il­
lustrate the pertinent relationships. 
Social Darwinism applied theories of natural selection to so­
cial class structure; assuming that those who rose to the top did 
so because they were most "fit" and that the poverty stricken were 
at the bottom because they had been "selected out."17 Continuing 
development of the industrial revolution altered society's concept 
of poverty. Under the new view, a person's economic status no 
longer reflected her or his character, but was instead a result of 
economic cycles beyond the control of the individual. 18 This 
modern approach removed much of the stigma from low economic 
status and made the poor deserving of social and legal assistance. 
Regardless of our current view of the past, interpretation of 
the law occurs within the context of the social definitions then ex­
tant. The law thus has integrity within its particular social envi­
ronment. 19 "It is important not to delude ourselves into thinking 
that [what we regard as] ideological monstrosities were constructed 
by monsters. "20 Plessy v. Ferguson21 established the "separate but 
equal" doctrine applied by the Supreme Court in public educa­
tion cases. In 1954, the Court in Brown v. Board of Education 22 
reached the conclusion that "separate but equal" was inherently 
17. Betten, American Attitudes Toward the Poor, 65 CURRENT HISTORY 1, 2 
(1965). "Although most Social Darwinists did not advocate a complete end to charity, 
they did argue that charity perpetuated the weaker elements of society and that desti ­
tution was useful in culling inferior people." Id. at 3. 
18. Woodard, supra note 7, at 304-05. 
19. Snyder, Legal Change and Social Value, in IMPACT ERA: LIMITATIONS AND 
POSSIBILITIES 144-45 (1976). Kuhn's analysis of the nature of scientific revolution 
illustrates the concept of a paradigm within the ideology of its own time. 
The more they [scientists] study, say, Aristotelian dynamics, ... the more 
certain they feel that those once current views of nature were, as a whole, 
neither less scientific nor more the product of human idiosyncrasy than 
those current today .... [S]cience has included bodies of belief quite in­
compatible with the ones we hold today. 
T. KUHN, supra note 7, at 2. 
"Rather than seeking the permanent contributions of an older science to our 
present vantage, they attempt to display the historial integrity of that science in its 
own time." Id. at 3. 
20. W. RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM 21 (1971). 

2l. 163 u.S. 537 (1896). 

22. 347 u.S. 483 (1954) ("separate but equal" educational facilities are inher­
ently unequal and thus deny equal protection). 
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unequal. Each interpretation of the Constitution was correct within 
the context of the social ideology of its time. Plessy rested on the 
foundation of a pervasive belief in the superiority of the white race. 
By the time the Court decided Brown, however, social reformers 
and the Court had successfully challenged the reasoning on which 
Plessy was based. 23 The paradigm based on the belief in white 
supremacy had lost its universal acceptance. As one social ideology 
gave way to the beginnings of another, the legal orientation toward 
the rights of racial minorities was correspondingly altered. 
The Social and Legal Status of Women 
At one time, similarly, it was considered to be within the na­
tural order for a woman to be subjected to the control of her hus­
band. 24 This perception of the physical subservience of married, 
women harmonized with the then existing political structure. Polit­
ically, legally, and socially, a woman upon marriage was subsumed 
by her husband. She retained virtually no personal, contractual, or 
property rights. 25 
The truth of how women came to hold this inferior position 
may be lost in prehistory, but possible scenarios have been pre­
sented in mythology, as well as in works of history and sociology. 26 
23. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 
(1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
For a discussion of the development of the jurisprudential attitude which led from 
Plessy to Brown, see Graham, A Jurisprudence of Equality: The Fourteenth Amend­
ment and School Desegregation, 11 AKRON L. REV. 203, 209-19 (1977). 
24. "Ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands ...." 1 Peter 3: 1-3:5. 
"The existence of civil and religious laws giving men superior rights over women 
nurtured the belief-born in the dim past in the smoke-filled caves of primitives­
that men also had the right to beat their wives." R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 
4, at 31-32. "For too long, Anglo-American law treated a man's physical abuse of his 
wife as different from any other assault, and, indeed, as an acceptable practice." 
Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 975 (1977), rev'd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 
165 (1978). 
25. See text accompanying notes 118-22 infra. 
26. We can imagine that when people lived at the mercy of nature, physical 
attributes determined social order. Women, the child bearers, were unsuited for long 
hunting or war-making sojourns, and the physical size and strength of men gave 
them power and authority. 
Welsh legends relate that in the early times of the great and powerful tribes, 
women were accorded freedom, respect, and love, although the monarchy was held 
by males. The connection between intercourse and conception was unknown. Preg­
nancy and childbirth were miracles wrought by women and the gods. Fatherhood 
was an unknown concept; a man's heirs were the children of his sisters or other 
female relatives. Sex was free and always an incident of love. Rape was virtually 
nonexistent; marriage unknown. 
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For example, Brownmiller, in Against Our Will,27 posits this ex­
planation of the earliest acceptance of male domination by women 
who were, anatomically, the natural prey of the men: 
[A]mong those creatures who were her predators, some might 
serve as her chosen protectors. Perhaps it was thus that the risky 
bargain was struck. Female fear of an open season of rape, and 
not a natural inclination toward monogamy, motherhood, and 
love, was probably the single causative factor in the original sub­
jugation of woman by man, the most important key to historic 
dependence, her domestication by protective mating. 28 
Woman thus gave up her freedom for protection. In this social 
context wife beating was accepted as an incident of ownership. "If 
Brownmiller is right, the female of the species paid a great price 
for protection. She sacrificed her power and, through monogamous 
loyalty to her husband, became the exclusive property of her pro­
tector. "29 This concept of natural order prevailed unchallenged 
until the twentieth century, when it began to wither. 
Isolating the precise factors which cause an ideology to lose its 
power is never easy. A variety of technological developments along 
with movements for social and legal equality certainly contributed 
to the downfall of old notions of male superiority. Struggles for 
equality of opportunity regardless of race, nationality, religion, and 
social position, foreshadowed the feminist reform movement. 30 
Technological advances, from the industrial revolution to the com­
puter age, have minimized the extent to which power derives from 
Observation of cattle breeding eventually developed perception of the connec­
tion between sexual intercourse and pregnancy. The desire was born in men to know 
their own children. The only way to accomplish this was to require sexual fidelity by 
the women. In return, the men had to bind themselves also. Voila! Marriage. A new 
era dawned-inheritance through the male line, the reduction of women to the status 
of property, rape, the exaltation and protection of virginity, jealousy, guilt, and, of 
course, adultery. For a rich and lyrical rendition of these legends, see E. WALTON, 
THE ISLAND OF THE MIGHTY (1970) (from the fourth branch of THE BOOKS OF THE 
WELSH MABINOGION). 
27. S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975). 
28. Id. at 16. 
29. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 26. "With the advent of the pairing marriage, 
the man seized the reins in the home and began viewing the people in it as units of 
property that comprised his wealth-in short, as chattel." Id. at 27. "If a woman 
showed any signs of having a will or a mind of her own, it seemed only natural that 
she be beaten as a strong-willed horse might be whipped and finally subdued." Id. 
30. "Although the industrial revolution did not directly cause feminism, it pro­
vided the context for the first collective assault on traditional ideas about woman's 
'place.' " W. CHAFE, WOMEN & EQUALITY 24 (1977). 
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physical strength. Medical developments creating effective birth 
control methods have maximized a woman's choice with respect to 
childbearing. These advances have greatly expanded the range of 
potential roles women can play in society. 
Whatever the causes, the old ideology has lost its universal 
influence and faces strong competition. 31 Thus, attitudes toward 
the status of women in our society are now at a crisis stage. Pat­
terns of social behavior between men and women, including mar­
ried couples, are changing along with traditional legal responses to 
these relationships.32 Pressure is building to reform the attitude of 
the legal system toward abused women and abusive husbands, with 
a greater emphasis on using the power of that system to protect the 
victims. 33 
The Search for Solutions 
As new standards emerge condemning wife abuse, pressure 
increases for reform of the existing institutional response. The de­
sign of the response will be based on the perceived causes of wife 
abuse. We may perceive the problem to be internal to the victim, 
and therefore find solutions which change or help her to not invite 
or allow such abuse. Alternatively, the energy of society's institu­
tions may be directed toward dealing in a universal manner with 
the source of the abuse, the abusive husband. 34 
Concentrating on the actions or characteristics of the abused 
wife "blames the victim. "35 This can include two approaches. 
31. For example, although the Federal Equal Rights Amendment has not been 
fully ratified, many states have added versions of the Amendment to their own state 
constitutions. 
32. Stimpson, Sex, Gender and American Culture, in WOMEN AND MEN: 
CHANGING ROLES, RELATIONSIDPS, AND PERCEPTIONS 201 (A. Cater ed. 1977). 
33. One of the greatest functions fulfilled by reformers is to sense that, in 
one way or another, for one reason or another, man's ability to control his 
environment has developed to a point where society can realistically aspire 
to abolish conduct or conditions theretofore conceived to be, and accepted 
as, unalterable. 
Woodard, supra note 7, at 287. 
34. We recognize that the abusive husband is also society's child. See note 116 
infra. 
35. "Blaming the victim" is an intellectual process whereby a social prob­
lem is analyzed in such a way that the causation is found to be in the qual­
ities and characteristics of the victim rather than in any deficiencies or struc­
tural defects in his environment. In addition, it is usually found that these 
characteristics are not inherent or genetic but are, rather, socially deter­
mined. They are stigmas of social origin and are, therefore, no fault of the 
victim himself. He is to be pitied, not censured, but nevertheless his prob­
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Either the victim is actually to blame, or if she is not to blame, the 
problem nevertheless is caused by her own characteristics. The 
first view sees the wife as being or doing something which invites 
or incites her husband to abuse her. She nags, denies him sex, 
neglects the housekeeping, serves T.V. dinners, and may even in 
truth want to be beaten. 36 The response is to pity the husband37 
and, afford no remedy to the undeserving wife. She had better 
learn to be a "good wife" in order to preserve marital harmony. 38 
A more humanitarian approach concedes that the husband is 
the non-incited aggressor, but still sees the problem and its solu­
tion in terms of characteristics of the wife. She must learn to stand 
up to her husband and not accept the violence. 39 Failing this, she 
must gain emotional strength and learn a skill or trade, thereby 
establishing her independence, and either leave the home or "kick 
the bum out."40 
The victim reform approach is especially appealing to those 
working "in the field" with abused wives. And for the individual 
victim who cannot wait until society and the law change, this may 
be the most realistic approach. The assertive, confident, and inde­
lems are to be defined as rooted basically in his own characteristics. 
Ryan, Emotional Disorder as a Social Problem; Implications for Mental Health 
Programs, 41 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 638, 639 (1971). 
36. Eisenberg & Micklow, The Assaulted Wife: "Catch 22" Revisited, 3 WOM­
EN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 138 (1977). "The theory of feminine masochism is one of the 
more enduring concepts of Sigmund Freud, who frequently addressed himself to the 
'woman problem: Freud believed that masochism-pleasure in pain-is inherent in 
the nonnal female nature ...." Id. at 143. 
37. When a battered woman told a therapist that she was extremely frightened 
"of [her] husband because he had tried to strangle [her] the night before, the 
therapist answered: 'But ma'am, do you ever think how terrible it is for your hus­
band that you're so afraid of him?'" B. WARRIOR, WORKING ON WIFE ABUSE 1-2 
(1977) (directory of people and organizations working to combat wife abuse). This 
book may be obtained by writing to the author at 46 Pleasant St., Cambridge, MA 
02139. 
38. One wife, after being beaten, overheard the officer who refused to arrest 
her husband say, "Maybe if I beat my wife she'd act right too." Bruno v. Codd, 90 
Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (1977), rev'd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978). 
39. It's important that a woman do two things to break the battered-wife 
syndrome. One is ... not to accept herself as a person deserving to be 
beaten. This requires active, positive steps by the woman, which may in­
clude seeking professional help both psychiatric and legal, discussing her 
feelings with her husband and perhaps ultimately leaving him. 
R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 203. 
40. We want to "make the victims less vulnerable, send them back into battle 
with better weapons, thicker armor, a higher level of morale." W. RYAN, supra note 
20, at 28. 
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pendent person is, indeed, less likely to be victimized by other 
individuals or by society.41 But it hardly seems appropriate for so­
ciety or our legal system to accept such a stopgap measure as an 
ultimate remedy. 42 
The greatest problem with concentrating on the victim is that 
such an approach inevitably forces the woman to either change 
herself or get out of the marriage. For many women, divorce is not 
a viable or acceptable course. 43 Most abused women need and seek 
protection from abuse, including a response from police and the 
courts which does not tolerate wife abuse. 44 Concentrating on the 
victim also avoids dealing forcefully and effectively with the aggres­
sor through the criminal justice system. "[U]ntil interspousal as­
sault is characterized and treated as a crime, a bodily injury crime 
that society will not tolerate, it has little chance of early solu­
tion. "45 
An approach focusing on the abusing husband could provide 
the abused wife with the immediate protection she needs and de­
serves. Additionally, this approach would affirm that the law is en­
forced for the benefit of society; that the problem of abused wives 
is not only an individual problem, but a detriment to society as a 
whole. 46 
Arguments against arrest and detention of the abusing husband 
emphasize his role as provider for his family. This is part of the 
41. Id. 
42. Similarly, the store owner may keep a gun to scare off thieves, as the police 
cannot guard the store at all times. Nevertheless, the law accepts responsibility for 
arresting and dealing with the thief, and does not require the store owner to handle 
thieves single-handedly. 
43. A divorce may not be acceptable for religious or social reasons. In addition, 
a woman may not be able to afford private legal counsel and may not be eligible to 
obtain help through a legal aid society either because she has too much income or 
because divorces are low priority cases at legal aid offices. Note, supra note 2, at 152 
n.120 (1977). 
44. Although it seems likely that once a woman brings legal action against her 
husband divorce is inevitable, this may not always be the case. At any rate, the law 
should not require that divorce proceedings be instituted before any relief is avail­
able. 
45. Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 36, at 161. 
46. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 9 (1972). 
An analogy discussed in W. RYAN, supra note 20, is the problem of lead paint in 
apartment houses, which causes blindness and brain damage when eaten by chil­
dren. Public health departments may produce materials urging parents to watch their 
children to prevent their ingesting paint, stressing the responsibility of the parents in 
safeguarding the health of their children. This approach focuses on the victims. In 
this situation, Ryan's "universalistic" approach would mean enforcing the existing 
statutory sanctions against landlords for using or retaining the lead paint. Id. at 22-23. 
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view that wife abuse is merely a family matter, to be interfered 
with as little as possible by the forces of the law. However, the 
woman who has been severely and repeatedly beaten by her hus­
band until she is desperate enough to call the police has a different 
view of her problem. 
When the victim calls the police, her essential concern is protec­
tion. She wants the law to stop her husband from beating her. 
She is demanding her rights as a citizen to protection from 
violent force. She is also demanding justice. She wants the per­
son who has committed an assault on her body taken away, 
punished, and prevented from assaulting her again. 47 
Thus, between the two possible approaches to wife abuse, 
focusing on the victim and dealing with the abuser, the latter will 
provide a comprehensive solution to the problem. Although focus­
ing on the victim can provide temporary relief to individual vic­
tims, it can not solve the problem permanently. The legal justice 
system must strive for long-term remedies based on affirmative 
condemnation of abusing husbands. The new standards emerging 
from the ideological crisis demand such a remedy. 
Although withering, the old ideology is hardly dead. The 
abused wife seeking redress through police and the courts will face 
substantial hurdles, including an illogical, intimidating, and in­
humane array of laws and legal procedures seemingly designed to 
guarantee frustration, failure, and ultimately, injustice. 48 Undoubt­
edly, if the abusing husband committed such brutal and repeated 
attacks on persons other than his wife, he would be arrested and 
incarcerated with little concern for the financial situation of his fam­
ily. It is cruelly ironic that concern for the wife's financial well­
being becomes a primary consideration only when she is the victim 
and her physical and emotional health are jeopardized. 
II. THE CRIMINAL LAw 
Introduction 
The old common law view which allowed a husband to beat 
his wife has disappeared from the de jure criminal justice system. 49 
47. R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 162. 
48. Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 36, at 147. 
49. In Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 975-76 (1977), 
,.ev'd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), the court stated, "If the allegations of the instant 
complaint ... are true, only the written law has changed; in reality wife beating is 
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But the remaining hurdles that effectively discourage and prevent 
abused wives from getting help through today's criminal justice sys­
tem illustrate that the system retains de facto license for spousal 
abuse. The obstacles include failure to arrest, systematic nonen­
forcement and regressive judicial interpretation of existing laws, 
and an absence of effective remedies. 
Any individual who has been assaulted can, and should, rea­
sonably expect prompt and effective police response. In many re­
ported instances, however, when confronted with a domestic situa­
tion, police officers avoid their obligations.50 They encourage the 
offensive behavior, intimidate or demean the woman, and in most 
cases neither escort the woman to receive medical help nor arrest 
the offender. 51 
At the prosecutorial stage, a woman is faced with a discretion­
ary system of selective enforcement. This barrier results in further 
screening and diversion of potential interspousal litigation. Prose­
cutors, like police officers, are reluctant to encourage prosecu­
tion. 52 
still condoned, if not approved, by some of those charged with protecting its 
victims.'" 
The early cases allowed at least moderate chastisement. Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. 
(1 Walker) 156 (1824) (husband permitted to moderately chastise wife without sub­
jecting himself to "vexatious" prosecution); State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453 (1868) (cri­
terion of indictable assault is effect produced, not instrument or manner of producing 
it); State v. Black, 60 N.C. (Win.) 262, 263 (1864) ("unless some permanent injury be 
inflicted ... the law will not invade the domestic forum or go behind the curtain 
...."). 
Just prior to the turn of the century, however, sentiment changed, and beating 
one's wife fell into disfavor. Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871) (wife is entitled to 
same protection of her person as husband); Bailey v. People, 54 Colo. 337, 342, 130 
P. 832, 834 (1913) (defendant's assertion that husband has right to control acts and 
will of wife by physical force rejected as "nothing less than monstrous at this period 
of our civilization"); Commonwealth v. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458 (1871) (husband in­
dicted for manslaughter); State v. Pettie, 80 N.C. 335 (1879) (two-year imprisonment for 
assault and battery against wife not cruel and unusual punishment). See also State v. 
Dowell, 106 N.C. 722, 11 S.E. 525 (1890); W. LAFAVE & A. ScO"rr, supra note 46, 
at 608. 
This change in judicial attitudes was expressly acknowledged in Harris v. State, 
71 Miss. 462, 14 So. 266 (1893). "This brutality found in the ancient common law ... 
[has been) ... repudiated in the administration of criminal law in our courts." Id. at 
464, 14 So. at 268. 
SO. See notes 64-75 infra and accompanying text. The great majority of these 
beatings take place in the home. "Boston City Hospital reports that approximately 70 
per cent of the assault victims received in its emergency room are known to be 
women who have been attacked in their homes, usually by a husband or lover." D. 
MARTIN, supra note 4, at 12 (footnote omitted). See id. at 16-17. 
51. See text accompanying notes 64-72 infra. 
52. See text accompanying note 81 infra. 
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The offenses of assault and battery are well defined by statute. 
There is nothing whatsoever in these laws to prohibit their being 
construed to apply to cases involving spousal abuse. 53 As a practical 
matter, bruises and lacerations resulting from beating, punching, or 
slapping are sufficient to sustain criminal prosecution for the mis­
demeanor of assault and battery. 54 Unfortunately, these laws have 
been applied in only a handful of cases of interspousal violence. 55 
Statistically, formal complaints are rarely filed when any of the 
above offenses are committed by a man against his wife. 56 The re­
luctance of the male dominated criminal justice system to interfere 
in "family quarrels" effectively deprives an abused wife of the pro­
tection of assault and battery law. 57 
Thus, upon reaching the decision to seek a remedy from the 
legal justice system, a woman faces a series of hurdles and filters 
that avoid or delay the institutional response. Too often this results 
53. "The problem is not a lack of law ... the problem is that existing laws are 
systematically unenforced ... women whose husbands beat them-often on a regular 
basis-have no effective remedy within the system as it now operates." R. LANGLEY 
& R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 154 (quoting Susan Jackson, attorney in San Francisco). 
54. "An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to com­
mit a violent injury on the person of another." CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West 1970). 
"A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person 
of another." CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 (West 1970). 
A criminal assault is distinguishable from a battery in that the former is merely 
an unlawful attempt to use force to the injury of another, while the latter is the actual 
unlawful use or commission of such violence. 
55. See note 49 supra. 
"By definition, spousal abuse constitutes assault, or aggravated assault depend­
ing on the seriousness of the attack, even though the Pennsylvania criminal justice 
system refuses to treat it as such." Note, Domestic Relations-The Protection From 
Abuse Act-Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon Supp. 1977), 51 TEMP. 
L.Q. 116, 123 (1978) (footnotes omitted). 
56. D. MARTIN, supra note 4. San Francisco District Attorney's Office Bureau 
of Family Relations reported that only eight of several thousand cases processed dur­
ing 1973-1974 led to a formal complaint and prosecution. Id. at 109-10. In Columbus, 
Ohio only two per cent of 3,626 direct complaints resulted in criminal charges. [d. 
at 112. 
57. D. Martin, A Feminist Analysis of Wife Beating, at 3 (May 5, 1977) (unpub­
lished report prepared for American Psychiatric Association Special Session­
Battered Women: Culture as Destiny, Toronto, Canada). 
Wife beating is tolerated in a legal system characterized by ancient chas­
tisement rigpts and the subordination of women in marriage. Moreover, rein­
forced by the nonacknowledgment of its criminal aspects, wife-beating re­
flects the devaluation of women as human beings. The legal system only 
offers the battered wife a band-aid for her wounds, both physical and 
psychological. 
Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 36, at 159. 
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in further beatings. When the present system fails to punish the 
offender the law loses its potential deterrent effect. By failing ade­
quately to perform their duties, the police, the prosecutors, the 
judiciary, and the legislators are all impliedly "blaming the 
victim. "58 This approach leaves the wife-victim, rather than the 
husband-abuser, at the mercy of the criminal justice system. 
The Police Function 
Police departments, the only public agency readily accessible 
on a twenty-four hour basis, are typically the first outside help 
sought by an abused wife. Police calls for family conflicts out­
number those for aggravated batteries, murders, and all other seri­
ous crimes combined. 59 Officers dread these "domestic distur­
bance" calls. This apprehension may result from the high incidence 
of violence directed at responding officers.60 Furthermore, many 
police officers dislike dealing with, or are unable to cope with, the 
emotional state of the parties. 61 Notwithstanding their reluctance, 
police officers must respond to these calls effectively. Abused 
women expect and deserve immediate response. 62 Once called, of­
ficers have an obligation to respond and to reduce the possibility of 
recurring violence. 63 
In an overwhelming majority of these calls, no arrest is made. 
Instead, the police often encourage the woman to reason with her 
assailant, and discourage her from demanding that an arrest be 
made. 64 This psychological restraint denies the victim her rights to 
58. See notes 35-48 supra and accompanying text. 
59. Pamas, The Police Response to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967 WIse. L. 
REV. 914 n.2. 
60. Connecticut Task Force on Abused Women: Abuse and the Law (Jan. 1977) 
(unpublished report). "Disturbances" were the largest incident-related death cate­
gory during the period of 1960-1965. "Fifty-eight officers or 21% of the 278 police­
men killed in the United States during that period were responding to disturbance 
calls." Pamas, supra note 59, at 920 n.25 (citation omitted). 
61. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 97. 
62. See D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 92. 
63. Pamas, Police Discretion and Diversion of Incidents of Intra-Family Vio­
lence, 36 L. & CONT. PROB. 539, 542 (1971). "[T]he police owe a duty of protection 
to battered wives, in the same manner they owe it to any citizen injured by another's 
assault ...." Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (1977), rev'd, 
407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978). This case is discussed in full in notes 77-79 infra and ac­
companying text. 
64. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 92-93. See also Maidment, The Law's Response 
to Marital Violence in England and the U.S.A., 26 INT. & COMPo L.Q. 403, 408 
(1977). 
578 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:565 
be uninjured and to have the offender arrested. Although in other 
potentially harmful situations, such as the typical barroom assault, 
the police may also encourage conciliation, violence within the 
home presents more potential for additional severe physical injury 
to the victim. As a practical matter, the victim of domestic violence 
often can not remove herself from the premises, especially if there 
are children in the home. 
When presented with a domestic situation, the police often 
suggest that the husband could be out on bail or personal recog­
nizance within hours.65 Such suggestions are accurate. The man 
will be out on bail, and the woman should be informed of that fact. 
This information, however, should not be offered merely to psycho­
logically restrain the woman from demanding an arrest. Rather, 
the officer should neutrally inform the victim of the probable du­
ration of detention, so that she may plan her actions accordingly. 
Responding officers also underscore the husband's role as the 
woman's only source of income. They point out that an arrest could 
result in the loss of his job, an increase in the marital violence, or 
both. Often, the police will discourage the complaining victim by 
telling her she has a civil problem and should call an attorney.66 
All of these typical police reactions to domestic disturbance calls 
avoid confrontation of the problems that sparked the complaint in 
the first place. 
This tepid police response frustrates beaten women who have 
turned to society for help by denying them a desperately needed 
remedy. Additionally, police leniency reinforces abusive behav­
ior. 67 An apathetic police response intensifies the abuser's percep­
tion that socially acceptable behavior includes beating his wife. 68 
The reinforcement of this social license to abuse, coupled with the 
antagonizing nature of a police call to the aggressor, makes calling 
65. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 94. Perhaps a modified system of temporary 
detention should be used in these situations to detain the offender until an im­
mediate protection order is issued by a magistrate. 
66. See R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 164. 
67. See D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 64 (Commander James D. Bannon, Ad­
dress to American Bar Association Conference, Montreal, Canada (1975)). Command­
er Bannon has been a member of the Detroit Police Department since 1949 and is 
also working toward a doctorate in sociology. 
68. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 98, (paraphrasing Commander James D. Ban­
non). In Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (1977), rev'd, 407 
N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), the court remarked, "Even more disturbing are incidents al­
leged in the affidavits in which the responding officers are quoted as giving support 
to the as saulting h us band." 
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the police one of the most counterproductive steps an abused 
woman can take. A woman who calls the police as a desperate 
measure to end a beating, then, is confronted by a painful irony 
when this measure aggravates, rather than alleviates, the violence. 
Police, as the first social institution called on to respond to a 
domestic beating, must reform many of their approaches and tech­
niques in order to effectively discharge their obligation to minimize 
grossly antisocial behavior. 
Police reform is impeded by the officers' personal attitudes be­
cause police officers are socialized in the same manner as the citi­
zens they are expected to protect. Since patterns of abuse are 
common within a family structure69 police officers who come from 
violent families may have a predisposition toward domestic violence 
that is as severe as the aggressor's. One study reported that a 
police officer told an abused woman that he beat his own wife; 
another officer told a woman to "go to bed with him like he 
wants."70 One commentator believes that these attitudes are a re­
sult of the police officers' training; they are taught to avoid arrest. 71 
In doing so, police officers ignore the special circumstances of 
domestic violence that favor arrest and that require immediate pro­
tection for the woman. 72 
69. Studies have shown that when children grow up in a home where their 
father beats their mother, a male child is more likely later to beat his spouse, and a 
female child is more likely to be beaten by her husband. The Battered Woman: 
Criminal and Civil Remedies, at 1 (May 5, 1977) (unpublished report prepared for 
American Psychiatric Association Special Session-Battered Women: Culture as De­
stiny, Toronto, Canada). 
70. L. Frost, B. Karl, G.]. Stillson MacDonnell, & D. Minasian, Connecticut 
Task Force on Abused Women: Household Violence Study-North Central and Capi­
tal Regions, at 11 (March 1977) (unpublished report). 
71. Pamas, supra note 59, at 931 n.64. The Michigan Police Training Academy 
procedure, set forth in D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 93, states: 
a. Avoid arrest if possible. Appeal to their vanity. 
b. Explain the procedure of obtaining a warrant. 
(1) Complainant must sign complaint. 
(2) Must appear in court. 
(3) Consider loss of time. 
(4) Cost of court. 
c. State that your only interest is to prevent a breach of the peace. 
d. Explain that attitudes usually change by court time. 
e. Recommend a postponement. 
(1) Court not in session. 
(2) No judge available. 
f. Don't be too harsh or. critical. 
(footnote omitted). 
72. See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra. 
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The law of arrest compounds these problems by not allowing 
for routine apprehension in domestic disturbances. In most juris­
dictions, an arrest for a misdemeanor can be made on the spot only 
if the act has been committed in the presence of an officer, or if a 
warrant has been issued. Because police are usually called to the 
scene after a beating, the victim must go to the district attorney's 
office or the clerk of courts for a warrant to be issued. 73 This pro­
cedure is too slow to offer the needed protection. 
The law of arrest poses obstacles to swift detention of assail­
ants. Several alternatives exist to overcome these barriers. First, an 
officer can, without a warrant, arrest upon the reasonable belief 
that a felony was committed and that the person identified com­
mitted the crime. 74 Because of the prevailing attitudes regarding 
domestic violence and the subjectivity involved in this determina­
tion, few arrests are made. Second, in many jurisdictions the 
victim can make a citizen's arrest even if the offense is a mis­
demeanor. Under this procedure the officer can take the accused 
into custody and the complainant is then liable for false arrest if the 
accused can show that the complainant fabricated the charge. Even 
though this avenue imposes no liability upon the officer, the police 
rarely inform the abused wife of this possibility.75 Finally, when 
the conduct complained of consists of threats or quarrelling using 
"vulgar, profane language, and such conduct occurs in the officer's 
presence" the charge of "disturbing the peace" may be used to 
arrest the offender. 76 
A formal challenge to the deficiencies of police department re­
sponse to domestic disturbance calls has been made in New York 
City. In Bruno v. Codd,77 plaintiffs, abused women, brought suit 
73. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 90. 
74. The Battered Woman: Criminal and Civil Remedies, supra note 69. D. 
MARTIN, supra note 4, at 90. 
75. D. MARTIN, supra note 4; The Battered Woman: Criminal and Civil Re­
medies, supra note 69. 
76. Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 259, 
264 (1971). 
77. 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976 (1977), rev'd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 
(1978) (defendant police department's motion for summary judgment denied). In re­
sponse to defendant police officers' argument with regard to municipal immunity and 
the discretionary power of the police officers, the court stated: 
Plaintiffs do not seek to abolish the traditional discretionary powers of the 
police; they merely seek to compel the police to exercise their discretion in 
each "particular situation," and not to automatically decline to make an ar­
rest solely because the assaulter and his victim are married to each other. 
Id. at 1047,396 N.Y.S.2d at 976. 
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against the police department, the family court, and the city proba­
tion employees. The complaint alleged that police officers called to 
the scene of a husband's assault on his wife "uniformly refuse[ d] to 
take action," even if the physical evidence showed injury. The 
plaintiffs also alleged that officers told the victims that they were 
unable to render assistance or make an arrest solely because the 
victim was the wife of the assailant. The court denied the police 
department-defendants' motion for summary judgment because of 
the existence of a factual issue as to whether the police had per­
formed their duty of providing wives with proper police service. 
On June 25, 1978, corporation counsel Allen G. Schwartz, the 
attorney for Police Commissioner Robert McGuire, signed a 1000­
word consent judgment obligating the police to arrest men who 
commit felonious assault, or any other felonies, against their wives 
as long as there is reasonable cause to believe that the husband 
committed the crime. 78 The agreement dispensed with adjudication 
of the factual issue of past police conduct. A motion to dismiss the 
complaint, made by the remaining defendants, the city probation 
and family court employees, was granted on appeal. 79 
But, in Hartzler v. City of San Jose, 46 Cal. App. 3d 6, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1975), 
the court of appeals affirmed the superior court's dismissal of an action for wrong­
ful death brought by the woman-decedent's administrator. Here, a woman had been 
killed by her estranged husband after the police had failed to respond for 45 minutes. 
There had been 20 calls to the police in the past, and on one occasion the estranged 
husband had been arrested. The court held the police department had absolute im­
munity from failure to provide sufficient police protection. But cf. Tarasoff v. Re­
gents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). 
78. Bruno v. McGuire, No. 21946176 (N.Y. App. Div., June 26, 1978) (consent 
decree). Under the agreement, the police will send officers out whenever a woman 
calls and says her husband has assaulted or threatened her. In addition to arresting 
in felony cases, if there is reason to believe that a lesser crime has been committed, 
the officers must still arrest unless they have proper "justification" not to arrest. 
They will not refuse to arrest just because the woman has not first been to family 
court. In addition, the officers may not use the potential reconciliation of the hus­
band and wife as an excuse not to arrest. 
The police also agreed to mandatory arrests in all cases where the woman has 
been to family court, has obtained an order of protection, and subsequently was as­
saulted or threatened by her husband. The police further agreed that upon interven­
tion in a husband-wife assault, they will remain on the scene, temporarily, to protect 
the wife and assist her in obtaining medical help if necessary. If the husband has left 
the premises, the police will follow "the same procedure for locating the husband as 
would be followed in cases" of crimes outside the family. Finally, supervisors at 
police precincts are responsible for their subordinates' compliance with all require­
ments of the agreement. 
79. Bruno v. Codd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978). 
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Prosecutonal Function 
In most jurisdictions, screening and diversion by the prose­
cutor's office may result in the individual prosecuting attorney's de­
cision not to prosecute. Even if a victim is successful in having an 
arrest effected, this system of selective enforcement makes it dif­
ficult for her to proceed with criminal litigation. Most prosecutors' 
perceptions of domestic disputes often produce dismissals and re­
ductions of charges. 
Perhaps prosecutors are reluctant to encourage litigation be­
cause a criminal charge mandates high bail, and upon conviction, 
long incarceration. 8o At the San Francisco District Attorney's Bu­
reau of Family Relations, the following "fundamentals" must exist 
before a complaint is authorized and a warrant sought: (1) a crime 
as defined by the California Penal Code, (2) identification of a spe­
cific defendant, (3) proof, such as witnesses and documents (if chil­
dren are the only witnesses the district attorney will not accept the 
case), (4) severe injuries, and (5) willingness of the victim to tes­
tify.81 The unlikelihood of all of these factors existing, particularly 
"severe" injuries and proof thereof, accounts for the failure to pros­
ecute in the majority of cases brought to the attention of the 
bureau of family relations. 
Faced with reluctant prosecutors,82 often a complainant is forced 
to accept intermediary steps such as warning letters, civil protec­
tion orders,83 or peace bonds. 84 There is- generally no statutory basis 
for peace bonds, and they are only as strong as subsequent enforce­
ment. Because they are seldom enforced, they are ineffective. 
80. Truninger, supra note 76, at 264. 
81. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 109. 
82. It is simply unfair, in light of the systematic discouragment that 
victims receive from the police and the time-consuming and almost insuper­
able hurdles to prosection erected by the district attorney's office, to blame 
the women for failing to follow through against their attackers and to use 
this failure as a primary excuse for nonenforcement of the law .... In many 
cases the reason a victimized woman drops charges or refuses to testify is 
not that she needs to be violently abused but the opposite need, to avoid a 
violent retaliation. 
R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 179-80 (quoting Susan Jackson, attorney in 
San Francisco). 
83. See notes 154-57 infra and accompanying text. 
84. Peace bonds are warnings ordering the aggressor to cease molesting or as­
saulting his wife. A California statute continues the bond for six months after is­
suance, and the court may require the accused to post bond not exceeding $5,000. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 706 (West 1970). The most recent appellate case involving § 
706 was decided in 1943. In re Way, 56 Cal. App. 2d 814, 133 P.2d 637 (1943). 
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Peace bonds may also involve constitutional problems because they 
fail to provide for trial by jury, fail to provide free counsel, fail to re­
quire proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and may subject a person 
to double jeopardy by providing that a conviction for breach of peace 
will be conclusive evidence of violating the security provision. 85 
If the police fail to arrest the abusing husband, the victim can 
file a complaint on her own initiative with the local clerk of courts, 
the district attorney, or the prosecutor. The facts in Bruno v. 
Codd86 illustrate the difficulty with such an approach. The plaintiffs 
alleged that family court petition clerks failed to allow petitioners 
timely access to the judge and abused their discretion in determin­
ing whether the complaints were sufficient to warrant preparation 
of a petition. 
Thus, prosecutors, like police authorities, avoid invoking the 
law. 87 Instead, efficient dispositions are achieved by discouraging 
women from pursuing prosecution. Once again women are faced 
with tacit condonation of the abuser's conduct and the likelihood of 
further violence. 
Judicial Function 
Even if the prosecutor decides to prosecute, the next hurdle 
to surmount is the court system. The issuance of a warrant is usu­
85. Truninger, supra note 76, at 266. If an indigent is unable to post bond he 
may be jailed in violation of his rights under the equal protection clause. This fea­
ture generates further constitutional problems. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) 
(imprisoning indigent for failure to pay traffic fines violated equal protection). 
86. 90 Misc. 2d at 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 979 (1977). The defendant probation 
department employees' motion to dismiss the complaint was denied due to evidence 
demonstrating a "callous disregard by probation officers of the statutory rights of 
women ... who need immediate protection from assaults by their husbands." How­
ever, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, reversed 
on the ground that the record did not present a properly justiciable cause. Bruno v. 
Codd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978). 
Similarly, a suit filed in 1975 in Cleveland, Ohio, Raguez v. Chandler; No. C74­
1064 (N.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 9, 1975) resulted in a consent decree in which the pros­
ecutor agreed to provide the relief requested, to give full consideration to each case 
on its merits, to schedule a prosecutor's hearing or request an investigation by the 
detective bureau if an arrest warrant or summons is not issued and the complaint is 
not frivolous, to provide and notify the woman of her rights to re-evaluation of a 
decision not to prosecute an alleged assailant, and to notify the police that men who 
assault women will be prosecuted. 
87. D. NEUBAUER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN MIDDLE AMERICA 129-30 (1974). 
One chief prosecutor has stated that "the sanctity of the marriage is more sacred 
than the criminal law and the one-punch fight ... it overrides the criminal code." R. 
LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 157-58, (quoting Chief Prosecutor of Wash­
tenaw County, Michigan). 
584 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:565 
ally a discretionary act by a magistrate, which occurs at a citation 
or preliminary hearing. This procedure rarely considers the future 
safety of the woman. Moreover, it may serve to distract the com­
plainant from her original purpose and lead her to believe errone­
ously that something is being done. "The woman who actually 
manages to have an arrest made and withstands the conciliation 
attempts of the prosecutor's office must expect cynicism regarding 
her intentions at every stage, even inside the courtroom itself. "88 
In Chicago's Court of Domestic Relations, "brief hearings are held, 
commonly followed by the imposition of an unfilled-out, unse­
cured, unrecorded, but threateningly imposed 'peace bond.' "89 
The Chicago magistrates who were interviewed all acknowledged 
the sham, extra-legal nature of the peace bond. Often domestic 
violence proceedings are not accorded traditional courtroom dig­
nity. 
In Detroit, where the proceedings are conducted in an or­
dered, dignified manner, "the lack of problem-solving dispositions 
remains the same."90 Judges may attempt to "string the case out" 
to allow the parties to resolve their differences, and then dismiss 
the case. Or, if this isn't successful, and a finding of guilty occurs, 
Detroit judges generally place the defendant on probation. 91 
Hence, although sanctions are imposed, little is accomplished. 92 
The judicial problem is not limited to failure to enforce exist­
ing laws, but also includes regressive judicial interpretation of cur­
rent law. To illustrate, California has a statute making it a felony 
for a man to inflict corporal injury on his wife. 93 The harm re­
88. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 114-15. Martin also states, "if judges would get 
tough and act like judges, rather than counselors or even practical jokers, perhaps 
battered women could obtain relief through the judicial process." Id. at 118. 
89. Pamas, Prosecutorial and Judicial Handling of Family Violence, 9 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 733, 748 (1973). See also notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text. 
90. Pamas, supra note 89, at 749. 
91. Id. 
92. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra. 
93. Any husband who willfully inflicts upon his wife corporal injury result­
ing in a traumatic condition, and any person who willfully inflicts upon any 
child any cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury resulting in a 
traumatic condition, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall 
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 10 years 
or in the county jail for not more than one year. 
CAL. PENAL COPE ~ 273d (Deering 1971) (amended 1977). The new section reads as 
follows: 
Any person who willfully inflicts upon his or her spouse, or any person who 
willfully inflicts upon any person of the opposite sex with whom he or she is 
cohabiting, corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition, is guilty of a 
felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in 
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quired to sustain a conviction under this California law is greater 
than simple assault but less than aggravated assault. 94 Neverthe­
less, in People v. Jones,95 a woman was convicted of manslaughter 
for killing her husband while defending herself against an assault as 
defined in California Penal Code section 273(d). Under California 
law, homicide while resisting a felony is justifiable. 96 The court 
held that a felony of the type defined in section 273( d) would not 
sustain an acquittal on grounds of justifiable homicide. 97 The judge 
in Jones stated that "the legislative purpose in enacting section 
273(d) ... was to reduce domestic conflict, not to promote resort 
to violence . . . . "98 Such reasoning indicates that courts have the 
attitude that the criminal justice system is not the place for domes­
tic problems. 99 
the state prison, or in the county jail for not more than one year. 
CAL. PENAL CODE ~ 273.5(a) (Deering Supp. 1978). 
Corporal injury is not defined by the statute, but has been held to be a "touch­
ing of the person of another against his will with physical force in an intentional, 
hostile and aggravated manner, or projecting of such force against his person." 
People v. Bums, 88 Cal. App. 2d 867, 873, 200 P.2d 134, 137 (1948). 
94. People v. Mitchell, 155 Cal. App. 2d 665, 318 P.2d 157 (1957) (broken jaw 
and contusions about the face, constituting aggravated assault-conviction pursuant 
to ~ 273d affirmed); People v. Bums, 88 Cal. App. 2d 867, 200 P.2d 132 (1948) 
(injuries and bruises on face and body, constituting simple assault-conviction pur­
suant to ~ 273d reversed). Aggravated assault is frequently classified as such by 
virtue of statutory provision when the assault is of a serious or heinous nature. 
95. 191 Cal. App. 2d 478, 12 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1961). 
96. CAL. PENAL CODE ~ 197 (Deering 1976). 
97. Although in Jones the court instructed the jury that the requirement for 
justifiable homicide would be satisfied if there were reasonable apprehension of 
death or great bodily harm, it was found that there was no such fear, although the 
deceased had picked up a table knife, raised it, and threatened to kill the defendant. 
One recent case, however, reached a different result. In People v. Cameron, 53 Cal. 
App. 3d 786, 126 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1976), the court rejected an equal protection argument 
involving ~ 273d and affirmed the conviction. The plaintiff argued that it applied 
only to married men, that the definition of the crimes was vague, and that it subjected 
one to cruel and unusual punishment. Cf People v. Thomas, 65 Cal. App. 3d 854, 
135 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1976) (~ 273d applied with same result with regard to child 
abuse). 
98. 191 Cal. App. 2d at 482, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 780. 
99. The Battered Woman: Criminal and Civil Remedies, supra note 69. 
The handling of domestic dispute cases by our courts is only one example of 
the failure of our criminal process to serve even loosely defined "correc­
tional" functions .... The lectures, threats, fines, permissive referrals, un­
supervised probation, or even probation with pro forma supervision which 
are substituted accomplish little in the reduction of recidivism. With respect 
to domestic disputants in court, few are sentenced to jail, and the great 
majority are handled summarily and off-the-cuff. What little innovation is 
utilized by our courts is frequently and disturbingly extralegal. 
Pamas, supra note 89, at 747-48. 
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Legislative Function 
A recent development has been the enactment of legislation 
aimed at intra-family offenses. This legislation gives courts a wider 
range of dispositional powers to effect rehabilitation rather than re­
tribution. Both New York100 and the District of Columbia101 have 
enacted statutes which divert intra-family offenses from the crimi­
nal court, making them civil or family offenses. These statutes take 
away from the complainant the physical protection provided by ar­
rest and successful criminal prosecution. Pennsylvania and Massa­
chusetts, however, have adopted legislation which places an affir­
mative duty on the police and the courts to provide temporary 
protection for persons suffering abuse. 102 
The New York statute requires that cases involving truly crim­
inal conduct be transferred to the criminal court. It was construed 
in Montalvo v. Montalvo,loa as defining the policy that wives and 
others bringing assault charges against family members generally 
do so to secure practical help, not criminal conviction and punish­
ment. The family court will retain jurisdiction if it finds that the 
processes available are likely to be helpful to the family. 
The District of Columbia statute seeks to assure that those 
charged "will be, if they are offenders, civil offenders .... We do 
not wish to stigmatize them. We want to keep their earning capac­
ity and also the possibility of self-respect and their connection with 
the family. "104 Once again, the woman's future safety is jeopar­
dized in order to preserve her husband's social and economic 
standing in the community. 105 
As a result of the inadequacies of the existing remedies, 
Pennsylvania recently adopted legislation which provides tempo­
ary relief for abused women. lOS Upon a showing of immediate and 
present danger of abuse, the court of common pleas has the juris­
diction to issue a temporary order of protection which requires the 
100. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (29A) § 812 (McKinney 1975). 
101. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16.1001 (1973). 
102. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977); 1978 Mass. Acts 
ch.447. 
103. 55 Misc. 2d 699, 286 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1968). See also People v. Berger, 40 
App. Div. 2d 192, 338 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1972). 
104. Judge Joseph Ryan, Proceedings, D.C. Bar Association's Orientation on 
the Superior Court 124-26 (Jan. 9, 1971), in Thompson, Representing the Accused 
Charged with an Intra/amily Offense, 18 PRAC. L. 41, 42 (Dec. 1972). 
105. Fields, Representing Battered Wives, or What to do Until the Police Ar­
rive, [1976-1977] 3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4025. 
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, H 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977). 
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abuser to vacate the home. 107 The act alleviates the problem of 
physical abuse for the duration of the court order. 
Massachusetts has also adopted an act providing certain tem­
porary protection for persons suffering abuse. 108 The act mandates 
that any court order which has been issued as a result of a domes­
tic dispute shall bear the follOwing language: "VIOLATION 
OF THIS ORDER IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE." Massachusetts 
law enforcement agencies are directed to establish procedures 
whereby an officer at the scene of the alleged violation will know 
the terms of the orders. The officer is also directed to use every 
reasonable means to enforce the orders. Additionally, any violation 
of the orders is a misdemeanor. 109 
Section two of the act describes the methods by which a 
petitioner may procure an order protecting her from abuse, and 
enumerates the terms which may be included. 110 If the plaintiff 
demonstrates a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse, 
107. Note, supra note 55. Because it offers only temporary relief, the act is ef­
fective as an emergency measure only. There are no provisions for rehabilitation 
or other methods of ending the abuse. Before the act, the woman had the option to 
leave, but the burden was on her to provide her own alternate living arrangements. 
See Commonwealth ex rel. Pitucci v. Pitucci, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 591, 189 A.2d 912 
(1963) (wife's right to support defeated upon her withdrawal from husband's home 
without adequate legal reason such as grounds for divorce or separation). Strong 
emotional and psychological factors, such as guilt due· to the myth that the wife is 
responsible for marital harmony, are also involved in a woman's decision to leave. 
108. 1978 Mass. Legis. Servo 198 (West). The text of this act is reprinted in full 
in McLellan, Massachusetts Divorce Practice and Procedure, 1 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 277, 321 n.191 (1978). 
109. 1978 Mass. Legis. Servo 198 (West) (to be codified as MASS. GEN. LAws 
ANN. ch. 208, § 34C). 
110. 1978 Mass. Legis. Servo 199 (West) (to be codified as MASS. GEN. LAws 
ANN. ch. 209A, § 3). The order may include: 
(a) ordering the defendant to refrain from abusing the plaintiff, whether 
the defendant is an adult or minor; 
(b) ordering the defendant to vacate forthwith the household; 
(c) awarding the plaintiff in the case of husband or wife temporary cus­
tody of a minor; 
(d) ordering the defendant to pay temporary support for the plaintiff or 
any child in the plaintiff's custody, or both, when the defendant has a legal 
obligation to support such person; 
(e) ordering the defendant to pay to the person abused monetary com­
pensation for losses suffered as a direct result of the abuse. Compensatory 
losses shall include, but not be limited to, loss of earnings or support, out­
of-pocket losses for injuries sustained, moving expenses and reasonable at­
torney fees. 
ld. 
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the court may enter a temporary order without notice, and thereaf­
ter notify the defendant and give him an opportunity to be 
heard. 111 
Chapter 209A, section 6 of the Massachusetts General Laws 
directs any law officer to use all reasonable means to prevent 
further abuse,112 including the right to arrest even if the violation 
is a misdemeanor pursuant to section thirty-four C of chapter 
208. 113 This provision partially alleviates a weakness in the law of 
arrest.114 The Massachusetts act, like the Pennsylvania act, pro­
vides relief from abuse for the duration of the court order. How­
ever, the Massachusetts act provides that the terms and conditions 
of the disposition of any criminal complaint may include "referral of 
the defendant to a clinic, facility or professional for one or more 
examinations, diagnoses, counseling or treatment; . . . or release of 
the defendant to the custody of a residential treatment facility. "115 
Thus, by virtue of the new act, Massachusetts courts are given the 
discretion to order rehabilitation services for the offender. 116 
111. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, § 4 (West Supp. 1979). 
112. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6 (West Supp. 1979). Other reasonable 
means include the following: 
(1) remaining on the scene as long as there is a danger to the physical 
safety of such person without the presence of a law officer, including but not 
limited to staying in the dwelling unit; 
(2) assisting such person in obtaining medical treatment necessitated by 
an assault, including driving the victim to the emergency room of the 
nearest hospital; 
(3) giving such person immediate and adequate notice of his rights; 
(4) arresting the person if the officer has probable cause to believe that 
a felony has been committed, or a misdemeanor has been committed in the 
officer's presence, or a misdemeanor has been committed pursuant to section 
thirty-four C of chapter two hundred and eight. 
Id. 
113. See text accompanying note 109 supra. 
114. See notes 72 & 73 supra and accompanying text. 
115. 1978 Mass. Legis. Servo 202 (West) (to be codified as MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 276, § 42A). 
116. Clearly, "the police owe a duty of protection to battered wives, in the 
same manner they owe it to any citizen injured by another's assault...." 90 Misc. 2d 
at 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 977. This is not to say, however, that abusive husbands are 
not themselves in need of help as "victims of society." This may indeed be true of 
all those who commit criminal acts. But the personal deprivations, agonies, or frus­
trations of the perpetrator do not prevent his or her arrest as a burglar, murderer, or 
saboteur. 
The legal response to wife abusers might well include counseling and voca­
tional training. This might be seen as society's compensating the abuser for whatever 
it did to him. 
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III. THE CIVIL LAW 
In addition to criminal sanctions, civil remedies should be 
available to any victim of violence. Civil remedies are needed 
when the criminal justice system denies protection to abused wives 
because of the perception that "domestic quarrels" are family mat­
ters, not to be interfered with by police and criminal courts. In a 
further search for aid, an abused wife may therefore seek justice 
through the civil law. However, here she will also find additional 
legal and procedural barriers. Civil remedies needed by the wife 
include tort actions, orders of protection and divorce. 
lnterspousal Tort Actions 
As outlined earlier, when social standards which were once 
universally accepted begin to lose their assumption of validity, a 
stage of crisis emerges, characterized by an abundance of contradic­
tory beliefs and behavior.u7 The law, reflecting the crisis, retains 
much of the old while tentatively exploring the new, and becomes, 
itself, wrought with controversy. The law of interspousal tort im­
munity illustrates the impact on the legal system of the emerging 
crisis in social ideology. 
At common law, it was well settled that, under coverture, the 
personal and property rights of a woman were virtually suspended 
during marriage. us The civil law made the husband and wife into 
one person-that one being the husband. u9 A wife could not sue 
or be sued in tort, own property, or make contracts. 120 Even a wife 
who lived apart from her husband and earned her own living could 
not bring an action for injury to her property by third persons. 121 
117. See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text. 
118. Coverture implies that a woman is "under the protection of her husband, 
and the common law will not allow her to do anything which may prejudice her 
rights or interests, without his advice, consent and approval. ... This sole act of a 
femme covert was simply void...." Osborn v. Horine, 19 Ill. 124, 125 (1857). 
119. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND § 598 (W. 
Jones ed. 1915). 
120. See Interspousal Violence: Insights But No Instant Answers, [1976-1977] 
3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2527. 
121. Moores v. Carter, 17 F. Cas. 714 (1828). Ann Moores lived apart from her 
husband Benjamin Moores, and "by her industry had become possessed of a small 
dwelling-house," which the defendants had broken into, vandalized and burglarized. 
Not only could Ann not bring an action in trespass herself, it was improper for her to 
be joined in the action; for as she had owned nothing, she had lost nothing. 
Every species of personal property which the wife may acquire by purchase, 
by her own labor, or by gift, during the coverture, belongs to the husband, 
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In addition, anything a wife earned belonged to her husband. 122 
Coverture required that even where there was personal bodily 
injury to the wife, she could sue only by joining her husband. 123 If 
she were to sue her husband in tort, he would be on both sides of 
the controversy, joined in an action against himself. Thus a wife 
was barred from bringing an action in tort against her husband, no 
matter how grievous the harm he inflicted, irrespective of whether 
the attack constituted a sufficient ground for divorce. 124 
In the post Civil War era all American jurisdictions passed 
Married Women's Acts or Emancipation Acts. 125 These laws were 
designed to remove the common law disabilities of a married 
woman and to give her the status of a femme sole. 126 A wife was 
given the right to own property in her own name, to enter into 
contracts, to keep her own earnings, to sue or be sued, to dispose 
of property in a will, and to establish her own separate place of resi­
dence with or without the permission of her husband. 127 
The acts varied greatly in language128 and judicial interpreta­
and consequently an injury to that property, or the taking of it away, can 
only give a right of action to the husband, and not to the wife. 
The dwelling-house, and all the goods and chattels purchased or owned 
by the wife, belonged to the husband, and for an injury done to that property 
the husband alone must sue. This doctrine is too well settled to be con­
troverted.... 
ld. 
122. "Services performed by a wife, for another for compensation, are pre­
sumed to be given on the husband's behalf." Plummer v. Trost, 81 Mo. 425 (1884). 
Where a wife's father gave her money, with which she purchased fowls and material 
for sewing, and, by sale of the fowls and her labor on the materials and other work, 
she accumulated money, it belonged to her husband's estate. Appeal of Speakman, 
71 Pa. 25 (1872). The husband's right to the services and earnings of his wife is 
absolute. Belford v. Crane, 16 N.J. Eq. 265 (1863). 
123. Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595 (1860). In a malpractice suit for personal 
injuries to the wife by a physician, the wife, if surviving, would not be able to main­
tain a separate action. 
124. See Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877). Mrs. Abbott was beaten, bound in 
irons, and forcibly imprisoned in an insane asylum by her husband and his cohorts. 
Her injuries at their hands were grounds for divorce because American law no longer 
allowed .a man to strike his wife. However, as the assault took place during cover­
ture, the wife could maintain no action against her husband or his confederates. 
125. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209, § 6 (West 1958); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
93-3-3 (1972); S.C. CODE § 10-216 (1962). 
126. Note, Husband and Wife Are Not One: The Marital Relationship in Tort 
Law, 43 UMKC L. REV. 334, 336 (1975). 
127. R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 39. 
128. Mo. REV. STAT. § 451.290 (1977) reads as follows: 
A married woman shall be deemed a femme sole so far as to enable her to 
carry on and transact business on her own account, to contract and be con­
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tion regarding the possibility of interspousal tort suits was divided. 
The very passage of the acts is evidence of the initial breakdown of 
the social paradigm which had given birth to and sustained the com­
mon law approach. The varied interpretations demonstrate the con­
troversy inherent in the crisis of social ideology which followed the 
breakdown. Some judges were quick to embrace a new concept of 
the role of women in society and their rights under the law. 129 
Others clung to the familiar, astounded by the audacity of a notion 
which, to them, challenged the sanctity of the very basis of Ameri­
can life, the family.130 
In some jurisdictions, therefore, the language giving married 
women the legal right to "sue and be sued" was construed to grant 
a wife the right to bring an action against her husband for damages 
resulting from assault and battery or other intentional torts. In 
eloquent opinions, these courts declared that civilization and jus­
tice had progressed to the point of holding a man liable for assaults 
upon the person of his wife. The fact that a man was married to his 
victim could no longer exempt him from such liability.13l 
tracted with, to sue and be sued, and to enforce and have enforced against 
her property such judgments as may be rendered for or against her ... with 
or without her husband being joined as a party.... 
"A married woman may sue and be sued in the same manner as if she were sole; but 
this section shall not be construed to authorize suits between husband and wife." 
HAWAll REv. STAT. § 573-5 (1976). "A married woman may, in all cases, sue and be 
sued without joining her husband with her to the same extent as if she were unmar­
ried; provided, that neither husband nor wife may sue the other for a tort to the 
person committed during coverture." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1959). "Husband 
and wife may sue each other." MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-3-3 (1972). "Nothing in this 
chapter contained shall enable a husband or wife to contract with or to sue each 
other ...." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-5 (West 1968). "A husband and wife have a cause 
of action against each other to recover damages sustained to their person or property 
as if they were unmarried." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (1976). "A married woman may 
sue and be sued as if she were unmarried. When the action is between herself and 
her husband she may likewise sue or be sued ...." S.C. CODE § 10-216 (1962). 
129. "The Legislature ... has given the wife an action against the husband for 
injuries to her property rights, and we can hardly conceive that the Legislature in­
tended to deny her the right to sue him separately, in tort, for damages arising from 
assaults upon her person." Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 44, 77 So. 335, 338 
(1917). 
130. State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453 (1868). In dicta the court stated 
that although husbands have no right to whip their wives, courts won't interfere, 
because to do so would inflict on society the greater evil of "raising the curtain upon 
domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence." [d. at 459. 
131. Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920). 
Whether a man has laid open his wife's head with a bludgeon, put out her 
eye, broken her arm, or poisoned her body, he is no longer exempt from 
liability to her on the ground that he vowed at the altar to 'love, cherish, and 
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In a majority of jurisdictions, however, the spectre of litigious, 
designing, or malevolent women suing their husbands for alleged 
injuries, dragging the private aspects of marriage through the 
"mud" of litigation, was more than the courts could face. 132 Al­
though many of the acts, read literally, would allow such actions, 133 
the courts were able to interpret the words to fit judicial concepts 
of the proper order of the universe, by construing the acts strictly, 
as being in derogation of the common law. 134 In Thompson v. 
Thompson 135 for example, the United States Supreme Court con­
strued a Washington, D.C. statute which read "married women 
shall have the power . . . to sue separately . . . for torts committed 
against them as fully and freely as if they were unmarried. . . . "136 
The majority, relying on the floodgate theory,137 and determined 
to protect the privacy of marriage, held that the statute could not 
have been intended to allow a wife to bring an assault and battery 
action against her husband. 
protect' her. We have progressed that far in civilization and justice .... 
Wives are no chattels. There are half a million women voters in North 
Carolina. They do not need to beg for protection for their persons, their 
property or their characters. They can command it. 
105 S.E. at 210 (complete quotation in unofficial reporter only). "If [the wife] may 
sue him for a broken promise, why may she not sue him for a broken arm?" Brown v. 
Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 46, 89 A. 889, 891 (1914). "If a married woman is either injured 
or damaged by another's illegal act, the statute gives her a remedy even though that 
other is her husband...." Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 5, 95 A. 657, 657 (1915). 
"[W]e are unable to perceive wherein either public policy, or society, or the sanctity 
of the home, or the sacred relations of marriage, is better protected by denying her a 
reasonable compensation for injuries maliciously and feloniously inflicted upon her 
by a husband with a shotgun loaded with buckshot ...." Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 
124, 129-30, 140 P. 1022, 1025 (1914). 
132. The right to sue her husband in an action of assault and battery may 
perhaps be covered under the literal language ... but I think such was not 
• 	 the meaning and intent of the legislature ... the effect of giving so broad a 
construction ... might be to involve the husband and wife in perpetual 
controversy and litigation-to sow the seeds of perpetual domestic disorder. 
Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 368-69 (N.Y. 1863). 
133. E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 246.075 (West 1969). For a complete discussion 
of the interpretation of statutes in derogation of the common law, see 3 C. SANDS, 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ch. 61 (4th ed. 1974). 
134. "Statutes which ... establish rights or provide benefits ... not recognized 
by the common law have frequently been held subject to strict ... interpretation 
[and] ... are given the effect which makes the least ... change in the common law." 
[d. at 41. 
135. 218 U.S. 611 (1910). 
136. [d. at 615-16. 
137. "[T]his construction would at the sa-me time open the doors of the courts 
to accusations of all sorts of one spouse against the other. ..." [d. at 617. 
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The dissenting opinion, by Justice Harlan, jOined by Justice 
Holmes and Justice Hughes, insisted that the function of the Court 
was to decide only what the statute said, and not what it should 
say.138 Although this dissent has been widely quoted and praised in 
both cases139 and commentary,140 the majority holding remains the 
law regarding interspousal tort immunity in the District of Colum­
bia. 141 In addition to the District of Columbia, a dwindling major­
ity of American jurisdictions continues to uphold interspousal tort 
immunity. 142 
The trend, however, is definitely toward abrogation of the doc­
trine, especially in situations where its underlying policies are con­
sidered inapplicable. When the harmony of the home has already 
been severely disrupted, as where the husband has been beating 
his wife, the basis for denying recovery for intentional physical 
attacks no longer exists. 143 Terminating the marriage by separation, 
death, or divorce further emphasizes the absence of an underlying 
rationale. 144 As the foundations of interspousal tort immunity lose 
all but historical Significance, the doctrine comes under increased 
attack. 145 "The entering wedge is recognition that there is a tort, 
but disability to sue for it; . . . when the reasons for the disability 
138. "[Ilt is not within the functions of the court to ward off the dangers feared 
or the evils threatened simply by a judicial construction that will defeat the plainly 
expressed will of the legislative department." Id. at 621 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
139. "We are impelled to say that the philosophy of this great jurist appeals to 
us with more force and soundness and impresses us as more in harmony with the 
modem legislative intent on this question...." Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 129, 
140 P. 1022, 1025 (1914). See also Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 
(1920). 
140. E.g., Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband 
& Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 156 (1961); Note, Domestic 
Relations-Husband & Wife-Right of Wife To Sue Husband for Tort, 32 OR. L. 
REV. 60,65 (1952). 
141. "The doctrine of interspousal immunity prevails in the District of Colum­
bia." Edmunds v. Edmunds, 353 F. Supp. 287, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
142. E.g., Florida, Georgia, and Illinois. See note 145 infra. 
143. We hold that when a husband inflicts intentional harm upon the per­
son of his wife, the peace and harmony of the home has been so damaged 
that there is no danger that it will be further impaired by the maintaining of 
an action for damages and she may therefore maintain an action. 
Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 242, 271, 287 P.2d 585, 598 (1955). • 
144. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 863-64 (4th ed. 1971) 
(footnotes omitted). 
145. For compilations of states which hold majority and minority positions, see 
Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 138 N.W.2d 343, 355-58 (1965); 4B PERSONAL IN­
JURY (Matthew Bender) §§ 5-9 (1970 & Supp.); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955 & 
Supp.). 
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fail, the tort becomes actionable. "146 Of the growing minority of 
jurisdictions which have abrogated interspousal immunity, some 
have done so for both intentional tort and negligence actions, 147 
while others have retained some limitations on the right of the 
husband and wife to sue each other in tort. 148 The state of the law, 
then, remains in flux, reflecting the conflicting views extant today 
of the social and legal nature of the husband-wife relationship. 
Although for many abused women, a judgment proof husband 
or fear of retaliation give a remedy in tort little significance, in 
appropriate circumstances the abused wife must have such a rem­
edy available to her. Where no personal or legal bar to litigation 
or judgment exists, an award of damages may give an abused wife 
the money she needs to get away from her husband and start a 
new life. In addition, the availability of such suits may have a de­
terrent effect on some abusive husbands. At any rate, the denial of 
legal recourse to the victim of an intentional tort simply because 
the tortfeasor is her spouse, is based on the tenets of a fading social 
order. The emerging social paradigm, which assumes equal treat­
ment of women under the law, gives rise to demands that such 
disabilities be removed. 
The Family Couris 
Another area of the civil law to which many abused wives turn 
for assistance is that administered by the family courts. Available 
remedies include a variety of injunctive orders as well as actions 
pertaining to the marriage relationship, such as separation and di­
vorce. However, a woman seeking protection from her abusive 
husband through the family courts is likely to find only a time con­
suming and costly process which, in the end, avails her no relief. 
In some states, primary jurisdiction for adjudication of all intra­
family violence cases lies with the family court.149 But family court 
judges in these and other jurisdictions often treat the abused wife 
no better than do those in the criminal courts. The family court's 
ambivalent attitude regarding interspousal violence illustrates the 
legal response to the uncertain and changing state of social attitudes 
toward married women. Although statutes and case law may at times 
reflect the revolutionary notion that it is the duty of the legal sys­
146. W. PROSSER, supra note 144, at 863. 
147. For example, Arkansas, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Minnesota, and 
New Mexico. See note 145 supra. 
148.· For example, Oregon and Wisconsin. See note 145 supra. 
149. See text accompanying notes 100-15 supra. 
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tern to protect women from abusive husbands,150 those charged 
with administering the law remain champions of the older ideology 
regarding women, family, and marriage. 151 Family court clerks and 
probation officers may misstate the law to women seeking court 
assistance. 152 Judges may ignore statutory provisions imposing 
stricter sanctions and operate on the assumption that their role is 
to achieve reconciliation rather then to protect the victim of abuse. 
Family law and courts are supposedly acting in the interests of 
the family unit, though at the expense of married women. The at­
titude of the legislature, police and judges is that they are dealing 
not with a public crime, but with signs of a troubled marriage. 153 
One remedy offered by the family court is an order of protec­
tion, or restraining order, which theoretically requires that a hus­
band stay away from his wife. In practice, however, obtaining the 
order involves retaining an attorney, filing petitions, and then wait­
ing ten days before testifying at a hearing. During this time the 
woman is unprotected from her husband. 154 Even if she has the 
stamina and determination to obtain the order, she is very likely to 
find that if her husband violates the order it will not be enforced 
against him, and may merely serve to incite him to further violence 
against her.155 Such restraining orders waste time, energy, money, 
150. See Baker v. City of New York, 25 App. Div. 2d 770, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515 
(1966), holding that the issuance of a protective order to a woman who had been 
beaten by her husband created a special duty in the police to protect her. 
151. [T]hose who execute decisions ... mediate the written word with 
their cultural inheritance and personal prejudice. As a result, even where 
the law has provisions to aid the battered wife ... [she] may find a major 
obstacle in the stereotypical ideas of marriage, of appropriate behavior 
within marriage, and of marital violence which are held by the law officials 
with whom she must deal. 
Comment, Battered Wives: Some Social and Legal Problems, 2 BRIT. J.L. & 
SOC'y 201 (1975). 
152. "And, in one alleged incident, a woman in fear of her husband's attacks 
was informed by a petition clerk that seeing a judge would not 'help' unless she was 
prepared herself to serve a summons upon her husband." 90 Misc. 2d at 1047, 396 
N.Y.S.2d at 979. 
153. Goodman, Abused by her Husband-And the Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 
1975, at 35, col. 2. 
154. For attempts by the legislatures of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts to rem­
edy this situation, see notes 106-15 supra. 
155. "The order may make a woman feel more secure, but it does so falsely and 
only temporarily, because the man will be free to assault her again and will do so." 
Note, The Case for Legal Remedies for Abused Women, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 135, 157 (1977). The failure to enforce restraining orders parallels the prob­
lem with subsequent enforcement of peace bonds by the criminal courts. See note 84 
supra. 
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and emotion and consequently many legal aid attorneys refuse to 
obtain them. "To raise the hopes of a woman by obtaining a mean­
ingless piece of paper is cruel and shows a lack of respect for the 
intelligence of our clients. "156 
In addition, in most jurisdictions, either by law or by custom, 
a restraining order will only be issued if separation or divorce pro­
ceedings have been initiated. 157 Thus this remedy is not available 
to the woman who has not yet decided on divorce. ISS 
"These failures of the legal system restrict the victim's liberty, 
forcing her to suffer beatings which over the years increase in fre­
quency and severity. "159 The abused wife may thus be forced, by 
the failure of police and the courts to stop her husband from beat­
ing her, to seek dissolution of her marriage. This will have been 
accomplished, ironically, by the very family court system which has 
denied the woman protection by fashioning remedies based on a 
policy of preserving the family unit. 
For women who decide that divorce or separation is the best 
solution in their particular situation, the law of divorce presents 
many illogical obstacles based on an outmoded social order. Al­
though some jurisdictions have adopted "no-fault" dissolutions with 
no other grounds for divorce,160 others retain fault defenses which 
preclude equitable alimony settlements and distribution of prop­
erty.161 
156. D. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 109. But see notes 106-15 supra and accom­
panying text. 
157. For example, see Connecticut Task Force on Abused Women: Abuse and 
the Law 2 (Jan. 1977) (unpublished report). 
158. See note 43 supra. 
159. Fields, supra note 105. 
160. A typical statute of this kind is as follows: 
§4506. Grounds for dissolution or legal separation 
A court may decree a dissolution of the marriage or legal separation on 
either of the following grounds, which shall be pleaded generally: 
(1) Irreconcilable differences, which have caused the irremediable 
breakdown of the marriage. 
(2) Incurable insanity. 
§ 4507. Irreconcilable differences defined 
Irreconcilable differences are those grounds which are detennined by 
the court to be substantial reason for not continuing the marriage and which 
make it appear that the marriage should be dissolved. 
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4506, 4507 (West 1970). 
No-fault dissolution statutes vary from state to state with some requiring waiting 
periods, separation agreements, actual separation, or agreement of both parties before 
a divorce will be granted. H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 295-99 (1977). 
161. These are generally jurisdictions which, without revising all their divorce 
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Divorce reform is moving rapidly, and many jurisdictions allow 
no-fault divorces where agreed to by both parties. l62 A few juris­
dictions grant divorces on no-fault grounds only.l63 For the woman 
who does not fear her husband, the major reason for wanting a 
divorce is the desire for independent legal status, including the 
right to remarry.164 For the abused wife, however, divorce can 
mean that she will have some protection through the legal system 
if her ex-husband threatens or abuses her, as well as redress 
through the civil tort law. 165 
In those jurisdictions which retain fault defenses, it may be 
necessary to prove continued and violent attacks to obtain a di­
166vorce. In addition, a woman who has left the home may be 
found to have abandoned or deserted her husband. The presump­
tion of desertion created by her having left the home is difficult to 
rebut without evidence to corroborate her claims of having been 
forced to flee out of fear of her husband's violence against her and 
her children. l67 Once determined to have been at fa_ult, the woman 
may be denied the divorce. If the divorce is granted to the hus­
band, the woman may, on the basis of being at fault, be denied 
alimony or an equitable property settlement. 168 
law, simply tacked a ground such as "irreconcilable differences," or simply proof of 
actual separation, onto a list which included grounds such as adultery, cruelty, and 
abandonment. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw art. 10, § 170 (McKinney 1977). 
For an intensive discussion of various grounds for dissolution and property set­
tlements in Massachusetts, see McLellan, supra note 108. 
162. For a rundown of the grounds for divorce as of August 1, 1977 in each 
state in the country, see Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Over­
view, [1976-1977] 3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4047. 
163. See the California statute at note 160 supra. 
164. H. KRAUSE, supra note 160, at 361-62. 
165. "[D]ivorce is a very practical remedy. Divorce and the accompanying sup­
port and custody decrees give a woman economic and psychological freedom. A di­
vorce judgment is also the best way to get the man out of the house...." Note, 
supra note 2, at 159. In addition, interspousal tort immunity does not apply, of 
course, to people who are no longer married for torts committed after the dissolution 
of their marriage. 
166. "The battered wife should be aware that hospital, medical, police, and 
criminal court records can be used to prove her claims of abuse in her divorce pro­
ceedings." R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 4, at 215. 
167. "Wives of professional or businessmen have a hard time proving physical 
cruelty unless they have photographs, witnesses or medical reports. Judges are defe­
rential to and identify with high-status men. They do not believe wives who claim 
that these men have committed the 'lower class' act of wife beating." Fields, supra 
note 105, at 4026. 
168. "[I]f a divorce is granted against a wife on a 'fault' ground, she is pre­
cluded from obtaining alimony...." Krane v. Krane, 83 Misc. 2d 714, 715, 373 
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Some states allow divorce on both fault and no-fault grounds. 
In these jurisdictions, the husband of a woman who files for a no­
fault divorce may counterclaim on the basis of fault, challenging 
the wife's right to an equitable property settlement. l69 Thus the 
woman must obtain her husband's consent or acquiescence to the 
divorce, an unlikely occurrence in wife abuse situations; or, the 
wife may be coerced into giving up her property rights in return 
for an uncontested divorce. 
In those jUrisdictions which allow divorce only on grounds 
such as irreconcilable differences, the fault of either party is not a 
factor. In this context, alimony and property settlements are based 
on need and other circumstances unrelated to fault. l70 
Because of the inaction of the legal system, the woman often 
has no choice but to leave the home and seek alternative shelter. 
The old social ideology maintains that a woman belongs in her 
home no matter what, and that any woman who leaves the home 
may be presumed to have abandoned her husband, forcing him as 
the aggrieved party to seek divorce. l7l As this assumption loses its 
force, however, it becomes possible to view the break-up of a mar­
riage as being the fault of neither party, or to decide that the fault of 
either is not a relevant factor. The abused wife is particularly need­
ful of this approach. The very nature of wife abuse ensures that 
there typically are no witnesses other than children. l72 It is pat-
N.Y.S.2d 275, 276 (1975). "[Jludgment of divorce based upon the misconduct of the 
wife, ... precludes the wife from receiving alimony or from receiving possession of 
the marital residence...." Orloff v. Orloff, 49 App. Div. 2d 975, 975, 373 N.Y.S.2d 
888, 890 (1975). 
169. Gamino v. Gamino, 199 So. 2d 202 (La. 1967). The wife contended that 
the husband had abandoned the marital home. The record showed that the wife, 
without her husband's consent, rented an apartment on a street on which her hus­
band had refused to live. The wife was granted a divorce, but "[als a wife is not 
entitled to alimony unless she proves her freedom from fault ... and as ... she was 
equally guilty of fault, she is not entitled to alimony." Id. at 203. 
170. This is not always the result. For instance, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
has said that although the legislature has eliminated the fault standard for dissolution 
of marriages, it did not intend to modify traditional fault grounds for determining 
custody, support, alimony, and property division. Kretzschmar v. Kretzschmar, 48 
Mich. App. 279, 285, 210 N.W.2d 352, 355 (1973), discussed in Eisenberg & Micklow, 
supra note 36, at 153. 
171. For a discussion of the way in which the Michigan courts have handled 
cases where the wife alleges physical assault, see Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 
36, at 152-53. 
172. E. Hilberman & K. Munson, Sixty Battered Women: a Preliminary Report, 
at 3-5 (May 5, 1977) (unpublished report prepared for American Psychiatric Associa­
tion Special Session-Battered Women: Culture as Destiny, Toronto, Canada). 
599 1979) WIFE ABUSE 
ently unjust that in addition to being forced out of her home, she 
should then have that desperate flight used against her in divorce 
or property settlement proceedings. 
Thus, the family courts and family law treat abused wives in 
much the same manner as do other areas of the law. Although the 
treatment is not surprising in light of the present social and 
ideological climate, the failure of family courts to come to grips 
with the problem of domestic violence is disappointing because this 
specialized part of the legal system ought to be among the first to 
adapt to the needs of abused women. 
CONCLUSION 
As feminist reformers successfully challenge outdated concepts 
regarding the social and legal status of married women, contradic­
tion and confusion in the law of domestic violence will continue to 
reflect the resulting ideological crisis. Slow and uneven movement 
often characterizes the development of new ideologies. The turmoil 
that naturally accompanies social change will eventually subside 
with the ascendency of a new paradigm. As new attitudes become 
part of the fabric of our social order, the law will respond with 
statutes and case law which protect wives from abuse and afford 
them equal concern and respect under the law. 
Susan Ritter 
Sheri Tanne 
